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IV

STATEMENT OF JURDISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a~3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Issue: Did the trial court properly find Appellant's Confession of Judgment

to be a valid enforceable contract with its execution and filing with trial court a personal
appearance and not a "further proceedings" under Rule 74, Utah R. Civ. P.?
Standard of Review:

A

trial

court's

determination

of

the

enforceability of an agreement is a legal conclusion that the appellate court reviews for
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. Carter v. Sorensen, 90 P.3d 637,
(Utah 2004).
Preservation for Review: This issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: [Appellant's] June 17, 2004 Request For Hearing (R. 58-59), Judge Stephen
L. Henriod finding in favor of Appellee (R. 60); [Appellant's] August 2, 2004 Motion
and Memorandum To Set Aside Judgment (R. 61-68), which sought relief from the
Petitioner's [Appellee] Motion For Order To Show Cause, (R. 37-40); Judgment, (R. 4546); Appellee's first Garnisliment (R. 47-54 & 60); [Appellant's] June 16, 2005 Reply
and Request For Hearing (R. 110-111); Judge Steven L. Roth's denial of Appellant's
motion to set aside garnisliment (R. 117-119); and Federal Bankruptcy Judge Judith L.
Boulden's determination that Appellant's obligation to pay Appellee was based on
1

legitimate bona fide judgments that could be used to fund Appellee's Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Reorganization Plan. (R. 207, 210 & 213). Appellee requests that the Court
take judicial notice of Bankruptcy Petition #04-32149, attached hereto as Addendum No.
1, and additional bankruptcy documents also attached hereto as Addendum No. 2 and 3.
2.

Issue:

Was Appellant's Second Motion To Set Aside the Confession

of Judgment timely filed under Rule 60, Utah R. Civ. P., or under the legal doctrines of
law of the case and res judicata?
Standard of Review:

The appellate court reviews the trial court's denial of a

motion for relief from a judgment under Rule 60 of the Utah R. Civ. P. for abuse of
discretion. In reviewing a denial of relief from a judgment, the appellate court accords no
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law but reviews them for correctness.
Radakocich v. Comaby, 2006 UT App 454 and Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997).
A determination of whether res judicata and law of the case bars Appellant from
re-litigating his request for relief from the judgments presents questions of law which the
appellate court reviews for correctness. Massey v. Bd of Trustees of the Ogden Area
Community Action Committee, Inc., 86 P.3d 120 (2004) and Maoris &Assocs. v. Neways,
Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (2000).
Preservation for Review: This second issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: [Appellant's] Request For Hearing on June 17, 2004 (R. 58-59), at which
hearing Judge Stephen L. Henriod found in favor of Appellee (R. 60); [Appellant's]
Motion and Memorandum To Set Aside Judgment, filed August 2, 2004, (R. 61-68),
2

which sought relief from the Petitioner's [Appellee] Motion For Order To Show Cause,
(R. 37-40), Judgment, (R. 45-46), and Appellee's first Garnishment (R. 47-54 & 60).
[Appellant's] Reply and Request For Hearing, filed June 16, 2005 (R. 110-111), in which
Judge Steven L. Roth denied Appellant's motion to set aside Appellee's garnishment (R.
117-119). Federal Bankruptcy Judge Judith L. Boulden's April 26, 2005 and June 17,
2005 detenninations that Appellant's obligation to pay Appellee was based on legitimate
bona fide judgments that could be used to fund Appellee's Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Reorganization Plan. (R. 207, 210 & 213) (See Order Confirming Debtor's Chapter 13
Plan Following Contested Confirmation Hearing, dated June 17, 2005, attached hereto as
Addendum No. 2; And [Appellant's] Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Set Aside
Confession Of Judgment And In Support Of Respondent's Objection To Garnishment.
(R. 174-194).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This case involves Petitioner/Appellee Amy J. Migliore ("Amy") enforcing a
mediated agreement which resulted in Appellant confessing judgment, and two
subsequent judgments, during Amy's divorce from the Respondent/Appellant Scott E.
Migliore ("Appellant"), (R. 1-10). Appellant does not contest his mediated agreement,
but claims his Confession of Judgment is invalid because he was not provided with a
notice to appear or appoint counsel.
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On November 18, 2002 Amy filed for divorce (R. 1-10). On June 5, 2003 the
parties settled all outstanding issues between them with mediator Marcella Keck. (R.
220). When Appellant refused to perform his agreements per the mediation, his attorney
withdrew on October 31, 2004. (R. 34). For approximately thirty days no further actions
or papers were filed by either party. During this period, the parties received an offer on
the sale of the marital residence. Due to the home's greatly distressed and reduced sales
price, which distress Appellant was solely responsible for, Appellant represented to
Meridian Title that Amy would receive all of the home's sales proceeds. (R. 195-200). In
order to close the December 9, 2003 sale, Meridian Title explained to Appellant his
alternatives which required Appellant sign a writing which conformed to his
representations to Meridian Title, his realtor, and Amy, that he would pay Amy
$95,000.00 as follows: $25,000.00 within 90 days of the residence's sale, and the
remaining $70,000.00 within 30 days of the sale of his portable horse barn. (R. 34-36, 88,
151, 189, 200, 214, and 235).
After being advised of his alternatives, Appellant, Meridian Title, and his realtor
requested Amy's attorney draft a Confession of Judgment (R. 198-199, 206-207, 211).
Appellant reviewed the Confession of Judgment on November 25, 2003, and again on
December 4, 2003 (R. 198-199, 206-207). On December 4, 2003, a Meridian title officer
again fully explained the Confession of Judgment to Appellant as well as the alternatives
available to him (R. 198-199). Appellant stated that he understood what the Confession
of Judgment was for, what it meant, what it could be used for, and that he was surprised
4

that he did not owe Amy more than the amount specified therein. (R. 199, 205-208).
Appellant then chose to sign the Confession of Judgment rather than the alternatives
Meridian Title explained to him.

The Confession of Judgment was included in the

settlement documents furnished at closing and subsequently filed with the trial court on
December 5, 2003. (R. 198-200). For four years Amy has collected some of the amounts
set forth in the Confession of Judgment. Appellant asks this Court find his Confession of
Judgment unenforceable.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On November 18, 2002, Amy filed for divorce against Appellant (R. 1-10),

which Appellant answered on March 21, 2003. (R. 11-17).
2.

On June 5, 2003, the parties' mediated a resolution of their marital

differences with mediator Marcella Keck evidenced by a written interim memorandum
requiring Appellant: a) pay the marital residence's mortgage until the home sold; b) sign a
listing agreement to sell the marital residence; c) perform certain maintenance on the
marital residence; and d) pay Amy a lump sum of $25,000.00 within 90 days of the
home's sale. (R. 35, 39, 186, 189, 202, 220, 222, 235, & 246). No formal settlement was
signed.
3.

On October 31, 2003 Appellant's attorney, Wendy J. Lems, filed her first

Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel. (R. 32-33).
4.

In order to close the sale of the marital residence, Meridian Title required

Appellant put in writing and sign his representations that: a) Amy was to receive all the
5

proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, and b) he would pay Amy $95,000.00
following the sale of the marital residence by paying Amy $25,000.00 within 90 days of
the sale of the home, and the remaining $70,000.00 within 30 days of the sale of his
portable horse barn. (R. 34-36, 197-200).
5.

After Meridian Title explained to Appellant his alternatives, Appellant,

Meridian Title, and Appellant's realtor had Amy's attorney draft the Confession of
Judgment (R. 34-36), of which Appellant received two full and complete copies, one on
or about November 25, 2003, and one which he requested on December 4, 2003 (R. 198199,206-207).
6.

The Confession of Judgment and alternatives were again fully explained to

Appellant in the presence of his realtor, by a title officer at Meridian Title, after which
Appellant chose to sign the Confession of Judgment rather than pursue the alternatives
Meridian Title presented to him. (R. 198-199).
7.

The Confession of Judgment was filed with the Court on December 5,

2003. (R. 34-36).
8.

On February 27, 2004 Amy filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause, to

collect the amounts Appellant had agreed to pay at the mediation and as set forth in the
Confession of Judgment. (R. 37-46).
9.

On April 8, 2004 the order to show cause hearing was held before

Commissioner Susan Bradford. Appellant did not appear and judgment was entered in
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favor of Amy on May 7, 2004, in the amount of $25,000.00 and $500.00 in attorney fees
by Judge Stephen L. Henriod. (R. 45-46).
10.

On June 8, 2004 Amy filed her first Application for Garnishment. (R. 47-

55). Appellant objected to the garnishment and requested a hearing, claiming "signed
document 'slipped5 in w/documents while signing closing on real estate property-all
pages not received" (R. 59). Appellant did not appear at his July 12, 2004 hearing which
considered his objection to the garnishment, following which Judge Stephen L. Henriod
ruled in favor of Amy. (R. 60, 69-70).
11.

On July 29, 2004 Amy filed for federal bankruptcy protection. (R. 207, 210,

& 213). (See Bankruptcy Petition #04-32149, attached hereto as Addendum No. 1.
12.

On August 2, 2004 Appellant's attorney, Wendy J. Lems, filed a Notice of

Re-Appearance of Counsel, along with a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, (R. 67-68,
61-67), and motions for extensions of time, including additional time due to Amy's
bankruptcy filing. Both of Appellant's motions for additional time were granted. (R. 6466, 73-76 & 83-86).
13.

On October 20, 2004 Amy filed her second Application for Garnishment of

Appellant's wages and an Application for Writs of Execution (R. 87-96), in order to fund
her Chapter 13 bankruptcy reorganization plan. Appellant did not oppose Amy's second
garnishment.
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14.

With Amy's second Garnishment of Appellant's wages pending, his Motion

to Set Aside the Judgment pending, and without leave of the Court, Appellant's attorney
filed her second Withdrawal of Counsel on March 29, 2005. (R. 97-98).
15.

At an April 26, 2005 Bankruptcy Confirmation hearing of Amy's Chapter

13 plan, Appellant argued his position regarding the Confession of Judgment at issue in
the state court case. On June 17, 2005 Judge Boulden determined Appellant's obligation
to pay Amy was based on legitimate bona fide contracts and judgments which Amy could
use to fund her Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Reorganization Plan. (R. 207, 210, & 213). {See
Order Confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan, attached hereto as Addendum No. 2).
16.

On May 18, 2005 Amy filed her third Application for Garnishment. (R. 99-

17.

Appellant objected to the third garnishment of his wages claiming the

109).

garnishment was an "unlawful agreement to pay" and requested a hearing which hearing
was set for June 29, 2005 (R. 110-111, 114-116).
18.

Judge Stephen L. Roth denied Appellant's "motion to set aside

garnishment" and entered judgment against him on August 9, 2005 (R. 117-119).
19.

When Appellant's employer changed, Amy filed a Motion And Order In

Supplemental Proceedings which was set for November 29, 2005 to collect the
Confession of Judgment and Judgments related thereto (R. 120-123).
20.

Appellant and his attorney, Wendy J. Lems, appeared at the November 29,

2005 Supplemental Proceeding (R. 120-122), and offered to bifurcate the divorce (R.
8

123-128, 129-140), in exchange for Amy's forbearance in executing against Appellant's
property while he arranged to pay what he owed Amy. Amy agreed to Appellant's offer
and Appellant requested that she document for him the additional damages she sustained
by reason of Appellant's breach of his prior agreements with her.
21.

On April 14, 2006 Judge Stephen L. Roth entered Bifurcated Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Bifurcated Decree of Divorce, (R. 141-147) which
reserved "the issues of the division of the property of the parties, payment of debts and
other related matters therewith are hereby reserved for further determination or trial in
this matter" (R. 141-147), which were consistent with the parties' November 29, 2005
agreement.
22.

Appellant and his attorney requested Amy itemize what it cost her:

a)

When Appellant breached the mediated settlement agreement by refusing to

sign the listing agreement for more than 90 days (R. 197-200);
b)

When Appellant allowed the marital residence to go into foreclosure by

refusing to pay the mortgage thereon for 6 months (R. 198-200);
c)

When Appellant fraudulently executed a second mortgage on the marital

residence by forging Amy's signature on the loan documents to obtain the funds to
purchase his portable horse bam (R. 198-200);
d)

When Appellant refused to perform the maintenance he represented and

agreed he would perform (R. 195, 198); and
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e)

When Appellant did not disclose the Sandy City liens which had been

assessed against the marital residence for Appellant's violations of said governmental
building, side yard, and set back requirements. (R. 197).
23.

On February 6, 2006 Amy's federal bankruptcy was discharged, and her

case was closed on June 1, 2006. (R. 207, 210, & 213). {See Chapter 13 Trustee's Final
Report and Accounting of Completed Chapter 13 Plan, dated May 19, 2006, attached
hereto as Addendum No. 3).
24.

With Amy's bankruptcy reorganization concluded, Appellant had full

opportunity to file a Memorandum in support of his Motion To Set Aside Judgment, and
to submit the same for decision. Appellant and his attorney, Ms. Lems, declined to do so
and proceeded to comply with the terms of the parties1 November 29, 2005 agreement.
With Appellant's Motion To Set Aside Judgment still pending, and without leave of the
Court, Wendy Lems withdrew as Appellant's counsel a third time on June 12, 2006 (R.
148-149).
25.

On November 2, 2006 Amy then filed a new Writ of Execution (R. 150-

154) and on November 7, 2006 she filed a fourth Writ of Garnishment to collect the
amounts Appellant had on at least three prior occasions agreed to pay and which
Appellant confessed were due and owing to Amy. (R. 155-156).
26.

Appellant objected to Amy's fourth garnishment on the grounds that "the

signature for the judgment was acquired improperly" (R. 158) and requested a hearing
which was set for February 20, 2007. (R. 157-162).
10

27.

At the conclusion of the February 20, 2007 hearing, Judge Robert Faust

requested the parties file memoranda and case authority in support of the positions argued
at the hearing. (R. 171).
28.

Appellant's current attorney filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance and a

Memorandum in Support of Motion To Set Aside Confession Of Judgment And In
Support Of Respondent's Objection To Garnishment on March 12, 2007 even though no
motion was filed for the Memorandum to support. (R. 174-190).
29.

On April 12, 2007, Amy filed her Memorandum In Opposition To Motion

To Set Aside Confession Of Judgment And In Support Of Respondent's Objection To
Garnishment, with an accompanying Affidavit and Exhibits which outlined the
contractual nature of Appellant's prior agreements to pay her $95,000 following the sale
of the marital residence. (R. 198-199 & 194 -259).
30.

Judge Robert Faust, after reviewing the memoranda Appellant and Amy

submitted, denied Appellant's Motion To Set Aside Confession Of Judgment and
Objection To Garnishment on April 18, 2007' (R. 271-274), and on May 17, 2007,
Appellant filed his Notice Of Appeal. (R. 275-276).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant's May 17, 2007 appeal is not timely. Appellant should have appealed
the trial courts' determination that his December 4, 2003 Confession of Judgment was a
valid enforceable contract and the judgments that resulted therefrom not later than
October 20, 2004. While Appellant contested the validity of his Confession of Judgment
11

and Judgments entered against him with trial court judges Stephen L. Henriod, Stephen L.
Roth, and Robert P. Faust, he did not appeal three years of adverse rulings against him.
Neither Appellant nor his counsel timely moved for relief from: Amy's April 8,
2004 Order to Show Cause, (R. 37-44); the form of judgment mailed to Appellant on
April 26, 2004, (R. 46); the Judgment itself for $25,000, entered May 7, 2004; (R. 45-46);
the Hearing on Appellant's objection to garnishment of July 12, 2004, (R. 56, 60, 69-70)
(which Appellant requested but failed to appear at or attend). In addition, Appellant's
counsel asked for extension of time to file a Memorandum to support a Rule 60(b)
Motion to Set Aside the May 7, 2004 judgment and seek relief from the automatic stay
during Amy's bankruptcy proceeding, (R. 83-86). But again, neither Appellant nor his
counsel sought for any relief from the automatic stay, nor did they timely file the
Memorandum supporting their Rule 60(b) Motion To Set Aside Judgment, August 2,
2004, (R. 60); nor did they object to Amy's second Application For Garnishment on
October 20, 2004, (R. 91-96), nor did they exercise the last possible opportunity to file
their Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Judgment prior t the October 20, 2004 Garnishment.
Their actions not only show that the appeal is not timely, their actions ratified the
Confession of Judgment and all of the Judgments issued thereafter.
Appellant put in writing his understanding of his agreement and representations to
pay Amy. Appellant's offer of his Confession of Judgment, in which Amy agreed to
accept substantially less than what she would have otherwise received had Appellant not
breached his agreement, specified a sum certain that resolved the uncertainties of
12

litigation, its costs, and the terms and timing of Amy's property settlement. (R. 198-200).
Appellant's agreement, as shown by the Confession of Judgment, is simply a contract. (R.
34-36).
Contractual undertakings and agreements which are filed with the Court are not
and cannot be considered "further proceedings" under Rule 74 Utah R. Civ. P.
Appellant's Confession of Judgment constituted nothing more than a general personal
appearance after his counsel withdrew on October 31, 2003.

The general personal

appearance informed the Court of the terms, conditions, and undertakings Appellant had
assumed and promised to perform. Appellant chose to breach the terms of his mediated
agreement and the Confession of Judgment, which Confession of Judgment he does not
dispute having signed.
ARGUMENT
L
A.
Civ. P.

APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY:

Appellant's Motion Is Untimely And Improper Under Rule 60 U. R.

Relief from a judgment is recognized and provided for under Rule 60, U. R. Civ.
P., which states in pertinent part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order or proceeding for the follow reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
13

party;.... The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken.
Utah's interpretation of Rule 60 requires that a motion to set aside a judgment be
timely filed, that it show a basis under part (b) (1-6) of the Rule, and if a basis exists, that
a meritorious defense be raised to the action or judgment entered at issue.

(See

Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462). Appellant has failed to satisfy the requirements
for obtaining relief from his judgments.
1.

Timeliness of Respondent's Motion:

Rule 60(b) provides that a motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and if
filed under Rule 60(b)(l-3) be not more than 3 months after the judgment was entered or
taken. Appellant waited more than three years to file a memorandum in support of his
request that the trial court set aside his judgments.
Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion was not timely filed as evidenced by the facts set
forth above which establish: On June 5, 2003, the parties mediated an agreement of their
marital differences, which included the sale of the marital residence. (R. 35, 39, 186, 195200, 202, 222, 235, 246).

Appellant neglected his duties to timely sign a listing

agreement, make the mortgage payments, or fix up the home. And Wendy Lems withdrew
as Appellant's attorney on October 31, 2003. (R. 32-33). When a buyer made a
discounted offer to buy the residence based on the residence's seriously distressed
condition, the Appellant and Amy agreed to accept the offer rather than lose the residence
which was just days away from being foreclosed. (R. 34-36, 197-200).
14

When the marital residence's closing was imminent, Meridian Title would not
close the sale without a signed agreement by Appellant specifying what he would pay
Amy. (R. 197-199). Meridian Title's unwillingness to close was based on its and
Appellant's realtor's knowledge that Appellant had breached his agreement with Amy
and his having obtained a fraudulent second mortgage. (R. 198). Prior to closing, a title
officer at Meridian Title twice took the time to review and discuss with Appellant, with
his realtor present, alternatives Meridian Title could use to release the sales proceeds. (R.
198-199). Appellant chose the Confession of Judgment over the alternatives Meridian
Title explained to him. (R. 199).
Appellant, Meridian Title and Appellant's realtor requested Amy's attorney draft
the Confession of Judgment in accordance with Rule 58A(f) U. R. Civ. P., of which
Appellant received two full and complete copies before closing. (R. 198-199. 206-207).
At the closing, title officer Tuesday Martindale for Meridian Title, explained to Appellant
the Confession of Judgment and his alternatives. Appellant stated that he understood what
the Confession of Judgment was for, what it meant, what it could be used for, and that he
was surprised that he did not owe Amy more than the amount specified in the document,
at which time, he chose to sign the Confession of Judgment over Meridian Title's other
alternatives. (R. 199). The Confession of Judgment was then included in the settlement
and closing papers and was filed with the trial court on December 5, 2003. (R. 34-36),
{See Affidavit of Charlet Walkffif21 -24, R. 198-199).
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Appellant did not make any of the payments he promised to Amy under either his
mediated agreement or Confession of Judgment. Appellant did not object to the
Confession of Judgment when Amy served him with an Order to Show Cause on
February 275 2004. He did not appear at the hearing held on April 85 2004 before
Commissioner Susan Bradford (R. 44), and he did not respond when the form of
judgment was mailed to him on April 26, 2004. Judge Stephen L. Henriod entered
Judgment against Appellant on May 7, 2004, in the amount of $25,000.00 and $500.00 in
attorney fees. (R. 60, 69-70).
On June 8, 2004 Amy filed an Application for Garnishment of Appellant's wages.
(R. 47-55). Appellant objected to the garnishment and requested a hearing, claiming
"signed document 'slipped in' w/documents while signing closure on real estate property
- all pages not received." (R. 58-59). Defendant did not appear at the hearing he
requested on July 12, 2004. (R. 60). Judge Stephen L. Henriod ruled in favor of Amy and
entered Judgment against Appellant on August 2, 2004. (R. 60, 69-70).
Wendy J. Lems then filed a Notice of Re-Appearance of Counsel on August 2,
2004, along with a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. (R. 61-63, 67-68). While Amy's
second gamisliment was pending, (R. 91-96) and despite two requests for extensions of
time to file a supporting memorandum, which were granted, (R. 73-74, 83-84) Ms. Lems,
on March 29, 2005, without leave of court, withdrew as Appellant's counsel with said
gamisliment and motion pending. (R. 97-98). Appellant neglected to request any further
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extensions and never filed his supporting memorandum or complied with Rule 60(b)'s
requirements so that the trial court could consider his August 2, 2004 Motion.
Rule 60(b) Utah R. Civ. P., provided Appellant 3 months after the entry of his
Confession of Judgment and the trial court's May 7, 2004 and August 2, 2004 Judgments
within which to obtain relief from his Confession of Judgment or the judgments that
resulted therefrom. Appellant did not timely file his Rule 60(b) Motion for relief from his
judgment and he did not appeal the trial court's determination that said Judgments were
valid and fully enforceable.
While Amy's bankruptcy case is not before this court, she urges the court to take
judicial notice of Judge Boulden's Confirmation Order in Bankruptcy Petition number 0432149. While taking of judicial notice on appeal is discretionary and will be taken only
where there is a compelling countervailing principle served, Amy submits that the
exercise of such discretion would be appropriate here to the extent Appellant's objections
to the Confession of Judgment were considered and rejected by the bankruptcy court's
record, which Appellant chose not to appeal or otherwise contest. See Finlayson v.
Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 1994). {See Bankruptcy Petition No. 04-32149,
attached hereto as Addendum No. 1). This request is particularly appropriate where both
Appellant and Amy argued their positions regarding the Confession of Judgment before
Judge Boulden on April 26, 2005, who determined that Appellant's obligation to pay
Amy was based on legitimate bona fide judgments that could be used to fund Amy's
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Reorganization Plan. Judge Boulden entered an order to that
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effect with the Confirmation of Amy's Bankruptcy Plan on June 17, 2005. (See Order
Confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan Following Contested Confirmation Hearing,
attached hereto as Addendum No. 2).
Rule 60's U.R. Civ. P., three month time period for filing a motion to set aside the
December 4, 2003 Confession of Judgment, May 7, 2004 judgment and August 2, 2004
judgment have long since passed.

Judges Stephan L. Henriod, Judith A. Boulden,

Stephan L. Roth, and Robert Faust all correctly determined Appellant's Confession of
Judgment to be a valid, enforceable, agreement.
2.

Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, Excusable Neglect:

Neither Appellant, his former counsel, nor his current counsel claim Appellant is
entitled to relief from his Confession of Judgment because of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect.

In Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla Development

Corporation, 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court reversed a trial court's
denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment, when the defendant in the Interstate
case contacted his attorney, and acted with due diligence to overturn a default judgment.
Unlike the defendant in the Interstate case, Appellant upon receipt of notice if his default
and breach of his agreement, and the specific terms of his Confession of Judgment did not
contact his attorney, and he did not thereafter proceed with due diligence to set the
Confession of Judgment aside. Appellant instead sought to avoid satisfying the amounts
he agreed were due and owing Amy by contesting the garnishment of his wages to pay
Amy's creditors in her Chapter 13 Reorganization. (R. 60, 69-70, 61-63).
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Appellant in this case has opposed the collection of his Confession of Judgment
for 4 years. Twice when he was informed of hearing dates he requested, he failed to
appear (R. 60, 117), or act promptly or reasonably to set aside his Confession of Judgment
or to move this matter towards its conclusion. Even now, Appellant does not claim that
justice would be served if this Court were to ignore the evidence taken by Commissioner
Bradford, Judge Henriod, Judge Boulden, Judge Roth, and Judge Faust. Nor does
Appellant claim that his June 5, 2003 Mediation Agreement (R. 186), his December 4,
2003 Confession of Judgment, Judge Henriod5s July 12, 2004 or August 2, 2004
Judgments were improperly obtained or that Amy has taken an unfair advantage of him.
Interstate affirms the principal that access to the courts for protection of rights and
the settlement of disputes is one of the most important and fundamental factors in the
maintaining of a peaceable and well-ordered society.

Setting aside Appellant's

Confession of Judgment at this late date, after 4 years of collections that funded Amy's
bankruptcy reorganization, must be done in accordance with Utah's Rules of Civil
Procedure, which rules Appellant has ignored and flaunted thus far.
3.

Newly Discovered Evidence

Utah law is well settled that newly discovered evidence "must be of sufficient
substance that there is reasonable likelihood that with it there would have been a different
result." {See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 2007 UTCA 20060369 - 091307 quoting In re S.R., 735
P.2d 53, 58 Utah 1987). Appellant makes no claim that he is entitled to relief from his
Confession of Judgment due to newly discovered evidence.
19

4.

Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Other Misconduct

By inference, Appellant claims under Rule 60(b)(3), U. R. Civ. P., fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct on Amy's part as a basis for setting aside his
Confession of Judgment. Appellant made such allegations himself in his various
objections to the garnishment of his wages that he filed with the trial court. Appellant's
first objection before Judge Henriod claimed that the signature page [of the Confession of
Judgment] was "slipped in" at the closing (R. 58-59). Judge Henriod ruled against
Appellant on August 2, 2004 and entered judgment against him. (R. 69-70). Appellant did
not object to Amy's second garnishment filed on October 20, 2004 (R. 91 - 96),
notwithstanding his August 4, 2004 Motion To Set Aside Judgment (R. 61-62). Appellant
contested Amy's third garnishment before Judge Roth by claiming that the Confession of
Judgment was an "unlawful agreement to pay." (R. 110-11). Judge Roth ruled against
Appellant on June 29, 2005 and entered judgment against him on August 9, 2005, which
judgment Appellant did not object to.
Appellant objected to Amy's fourth garnishment on January 22, 2007 before Judge
Faust by claiming "the signature for the judgment was acquired improperly" and that his
property was exempt because it was "used for Business Partnership." (R. 157-158).
Accompanying Amy's memorandum opposing Appellant's objection to the garnishment
argued to Judge Faust was the Affidavit of Charlet Walk, Appellant's realtor. (R. 194200). All of Appellants' objections to each of Amy's garnishments were addressed by
Charlet Walk's facts. Charlet Walk was present when a title officer at Meridian Title
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explained to Appellant the alternatives available to him prior to November 25, 2003 as
she was the individual that approached Amy's attorney and requested the Confession of
Judgment. Charlet Walk was present on December 4, 4003 when another title officer at
Meridian explained to Appellant the Confession of Judgment. (R. 198). Charlet Walk
observed Appellant review all three pages of the Confession of Judgment, she heard him
indicate his understanding of it before he executed it, and she saw him receive his own
copy of it with the papers Meridian Title provided to him at the closing of his home's
sale. (R. 198-199).
After considering Appellant's third objection, Judge Faust found on April 18,
2007, that Appellant's "objections and concerns regarding the validity of the Garnishment
entered in this case (and the underlying Confession of Judgment) have been reviewed by
two previously assigned Judges, each of whom denied these objections. Therefore, the
[Appellant's] renewed requests to set aside the Confession of Judgment and Garnishment
are procedurally improper." (R. 272).
5.

Meritorious Defense

A meritorious defense is one that sets forth specific and sufficiently detailed facts
which, if proven, would result in a judgment different from the one entered. (See
Hernandez v. Baker, supra, page 462). Under Hernandez, in order for Appellant to be
granted relief from his Confession of Judgment, he must show that he has a meritorious
defense to the Confession of Judgment. Appellant has not complied with the Hernandez
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requirements or set forth a meritorious defense because there are no facts that contradict
the facts Appellant freely entered into:
1)

A mediated agreement with Amy through mediator Marcella Keck; and

2)

The Confession of Judgment after it was folly explained to him by Meridian

Title.
Notwithstanding Appellant's arguments to the contrary, once the home sold and
closed, the sale was final and that part of the divorce settlement also became final and
irrevocable when the parties' executed the closing documents on the home. Appellant
was fully informed and aware what he was doing and what was going on when he signed
the documents to conclude the sale of the martial residence. (R. 195-200). He solely
selected the form of agreement he wanted to enter into after Meridian Title advised him
of his alternatives. (R. 199). He was active and informed about the agreement; and he
persuaded Amy to accept a significantly reduced property settlement in comparison to
what Amy had otherwise agreed to accept with mediator Marcella Keck. And Appellant
signed the Confession of Judgment after he had reviewed the same on November 25,
2003 and December 4, 2003 when Meridian Title reviewed with him his alternatives.
The facts of this case reaffirm Appellant's lack of a meritorious defense.
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B.
Judicata
1.

Appellant's Motion Is Improper Under Law Of The Case And Res

Issue Preclusion

Res judicata has two separate yet equally important facets: issue preclusion and
claim preclusion. Utah's decisional law states that issue preclusion or collateral estoppel:
....arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or privies from
relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the
first suit. In effect, once a party has had his . . . day in court and lost, he . . .
does not get a second chance to prevail on the same issues. State v. Paolone,
2007 UTCA 20051142 - 083007 quoting Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, \
12,99P.3d842.
Four factors must be established to invoke collateral estoppel:
(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one
presented in the instant action; (2) the party against whom issue preclusion is
asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; (3)
the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4)
the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Id. zt% 13.
The parties here met all the requirements articulated under Utah's decisional law
for issue preclusion and collateral estoppel to apply, particularly where Appellant was
given every opportunity to fairly litigate the enforceability of his Confession of Judgment
by Judge Henriod, Judge Roth, and Judge Faust. Each of Appellant's objections in state
and federal court resulted in final judgments on the merits of his objections. Appellant
was the only one that objected to Amy's use of the Confession of Judgment to fund her
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Chapter 13 reorganization, which Judge Judith L. Boulden determined, on June 17, 2005,
could be used the fund Amy's Chapter 13 plan.
Appellant's current claim that the Confession of Judgment is invalid because he
was not given a notice to appear in person or appoint counsel overlooks the simple fact
that the Confession of Judgment is exactly what it purports to be which is: a) a contract;
b) that specified a sum certain; c) that resolved the uncertainties of litigation and its costs;
and d) that set forth the terms and timing of the parties' property settlement. (R. 34-36).
The Confession of Judgment is also a general personal appearance that informed
the Court of Appellant's agreement, its terms and conditions, and of Appellant's
undertakings which he assumed and promised to perform in connection with his pending
divorce after 33 years of marriage. (R. 34-36). Nothing happened in the divorce action,
with the trial court, or to Appellant when his Confession of Judgment was filed with the
Court. It was only after Appellant was given every opportunity to perform that formal
court action was taken to move Appellant's agreed upon property settlement towards its
conclusion. (R. 222, 242, 244, &43).
Appellant's claim that the Confession of Judgment is invalid as there was no
agreement, or meeting of the minds, because he never saw or agreed to all the terms in the
Confession of Judgment is without merit. (R. 198-199, 206-207). All three trial court
judges and the bankruptcy court judge that heard Appellant's claims and considered his
evidence that a document was 'slipped in,' that it was 'unlawful,' and that his 'signature
was acquired improperly' were not at all persuaded by his arguments. (R. 60, 69-70, 11724

119, and 271-273). In addition, the trial court had the factual evidence it needed to make a
factual determination based upon the testimony and subsequent Affidavit of Charlet
Walk, a witness to Appellant's having received the complete document, having it
explained to him, hearing his indication that he understood it and then saw him execute
the same. (R. 197-200).
The facts and record demonstrate the numerous times Amy has had to continuously
return to court to defend the enforceability of Appellant's mediated agreement and
Confession of Judgment. (R. 37-46, 47-55, 60, 69-70, 87-96, 117-119, 120-123, 157-162,
171, 197-200, 206-207, 210, 213 and 271-274). Utah recognizes the hardship created by
one party having to re-litigate the same issue, balanced by the granting of relief to the
party seeking relief who had no opportunity to be heard regarding a contested issue. {See
Airkem Intermoiintain v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 1973). Appellant's
situation is exactly the is even more compelling as he received the benefit of being able to
argue the same issue, in separate courts, to four different judges. Each time Appellant has
lost.
2.

Claim Preclusion

Claim preclusion is similar to issue preclusion, except that
... .the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first
suit or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. State
v. Gibson, 2006 UT App 490, quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT
13 *{ 34, 73 P.3d 325, and Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, Tf 58, 44
P.3d663.
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First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or
be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Miller v. USAA
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6 at 1[ 58, 44 P.3d 663 quoting Maoris & Assocs.f 2000
UT91at\20, 16 PM1214.
As with Res Judicata, the parties meet all the criteria for claim preclusion to apply
in this case. Appellant first raised his claim of Amy's violation of Rule 74 U. R. Civ. P.
before Judge Faust, but Appellant could and should have raised this issue over the three
years during which collection of his Confession of Judgment was occurring. Judge
Henriod's May 5, 2004, Judgment (R. 45-46), could and should have been reviewed or
appealed not more than three months after the judgment was entered. As already pointed
out, Appellant and his counsel declined to do so.
The fact that Appellant repeatedly refuses to comply with the terms of his
agreements for the four years Amy continually pursued collection of the judgments does
not provide Appellant a basis for re-litigating what has already been decided against him
by three state court judges and a federal bankruptcy judge.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THE CONFESSION OF
JUDGMENT TO BE A VALID ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT.
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is that there be a
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient defmiteness to be enforced. A-l
Disposal v. Ingersoll 2007 UTCA 20060261 - 080907 quoting Valcarce v.
Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961).
The facts of this case clearly establish the parties had a meeting of the

minds at the mediation with Marcella Keck regarding Appellant's obligations to Amy
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concerning the marital residence and her property settlement, the terms of which are
outlined above and in Appellant's Confession of Judgment. The trial court in three
separate rulings, together with a bankruptcy judge, detennined that the Confession of
Judgment was a valid, enforceable contract and that the judgments that resulted therefrom
are fully enforceable.
III.

APPELLANT'S SIGNING THE CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
AND ITS FILING WITH THE COURT WAS APPELLANT'S
GENERAL PERSONAL APPEARANCE BY WHICH APPELLANT
BENEFITED TO APPELLEE'S DETRIMENT.
Although Utah courts have not expressly ruled on what submittals to the court

constitute an "appearance," some jurisdictions have definitively declared what acts
comprise an appearance.

Any action on the part of a party, except to object to

jurisdiction, which recognizes the case as in court, constitutes a general appearance.
Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Pa. 1961). The Wyoming Supreme
Court stated that a party has "appeared" in an action when the party has made some
submittal or presentation to the court; Multiple Resort Ownership Plan, Inc. v. DesignBuild-Manage, Inc. 45 P.3d 647 (Wyo. 2002); whereas the Tennessee Court of Appeals
found that an appearance must be shown from a party's seeking, taking, or agreeing to
some step or proceeding in cause beneficial to that party or detrimental to the other party,
and that affirmative action is sought from the court. Dooley v. Dooley, 980 S.W.2d 369
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1998) quoting Patterson v. Rodwell Intern., 665 S.W.2d 96 (Term. 1984).
Stipulations or agreements entered into between parties, or their counsel, with reference
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to a pending suit are usually regarded as a general appearance; Moore v. Superior Court.,
87 Cal. Rptr. 620 (4th Dist. 1970); or for authorizing a judgment or decree. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Griset, 208 P. 673 (Cal. 1922).
Regardless of whether this court follows Wyoming's, Tennessee's or California's
method of determining what constitutes an "appearance", Appellant knew that his
Confession of Judgment, once signed, would be presented to the Court and would be used
to document his agreement in connection with the sale of the home which released him
from mortgage payments he was not willing to make.
Once Appellant entered his personal appearance, his choice to intentionally breach
the terms of his mediated agreement (R. 222), to willfully disregarding his contractual
undertakings (R. 242), by purposefully refusing to attend the April 8, 2004 Order To
Show Cause hearing (R. 44), and deliberately ignoring the April 26, 2004 form of
judgment only to contest the garnishment of his wages, while not attending hearings he
requested, (R. 45-46, 69-70, 118-119), demonstrates a cold, calculated, deliberate, and
planned indifference which bankrupted his wife, by his fighting every effort to collect
what he contractually, legally, and morally agreed to pay Amy after 33 years of marriage.
Of all the alternatives Meridian Title explained to Appellant, he chose the
Confession of Judgment which benefited him economically by more than $55,000.00 to
Amy's detriment. (R. 199-200). Prior to filing the Confession of Judgment, Appellant
sought, took, and agreed to steps and procedures that were money-wise to him and
financially detrimental to Amy. Whether Appellant's actions in connection with his
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signing the Confession of judgment are considered individually or as a whole, the filing
of his Confession of Judgment was the entry of a general appearance by his voluntary act.
(R. 197-200).
A.

Appellant's Confession Of Judgment Is Not a "Further Proceedings"
In The Trial Court
Appellant contends that Rule 74 of the U. R. Civ. P., requires the Confession of

Judgment be set aside, and that it be found to be "further proceedings" in the trial court.
The purpose of Rule 74 is that no court action be taken against a party without his or her
knowledge. Appellant cites Loporto v. Hoegemann, 982 P.2d 586 (UT App. 1999) as
restricting Amy and the court from continuing to proceed further against him as an
unrepresented party. Appellant's position is without merit as Loporto is distinguished
from this case. Based on the facts and reasons set forth above, Appellant's contractual
undertakings and agreements which a non-party (i.e„ Meridian Title, his realtor) required
of him are not and were not "further proceedings" in Appellant's pending divorce action.
Appellant was not prejudiced by informing the Court of the terms of his
agreement, which left Amy penniless and bankrupt if he refused to pay what he agreed to
pay.

Judge Faust correctly stated that "the Court is not convinced that the notice

provision of Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was intended to invalidate
contractual agreements. This is particularly true in this case, where the [Appellant]
participated in mediation, was fully aware of the mediated agreement on which the
Confession of Judgment is based and executed the Confession of Judgment as part of the
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closing on the sale of the marital residence, which the [Appellant] again fully participated
in." (R. 272).
CONCLUSION
Based on the facts and for the reasons stated above, the trial courts' rulings,
determinations, and judgments should be affirmed and Amy should be awarded her costs
and attorneys fees of this appeal, pursuant to the terms of the Confession of Judgment
which states "[i]f defendant [Appellant] fails to pay any of the sums at the times
specified, plaintiff [Amy] shall be entitled to proceed with all appropriate steps to collect
the same together with plaintiffs [Amy's] costs and attorney's fees incurred therewith."
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of December, 2007.

Brett D. Cragun
Sylvia O. Kralik
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE were served upon the following individuals by mailing copies thereof,
postage prepaid, to said individuals at the following address this 1 Oth day of December,
2007.
F. Kevin Bond
Budge W. Call
Attorneys for Respondent
8 East Broadway, Suite 720
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

1.

Bankruptcy Petition No. 04-32149

2.

Order Confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 Plan Following Contested
Confirmation Hearing

3.

Chapter 13 Trustee's Final Report and Accounting of
Completed Chapter 13 Plan

(Official Form 1) (12/03)

United States Bankruptcy Court

IFORMBI
1

J Voluntary Petition

District of Utah

[Name of Debtor (if individual, enter Last, First, Middle)
1 Migliore, Amy

(Name of Joint Debtor (Spouse) (Last, First, Middle)

I

IAII Other Names used by the Debtor m the last 6 years
[(include married, maiden, and trade names)

(All Other Names used by the Joint Debtor in the last 6 years
(include married, maiden, and trade names)

I
I

iLast four digits of Soc Sec No / Complete EIN or other Tax ID No

JLast four digits of Soc Sec No / Complete EIN or other Tax ID No

1

(if more than one state all)

l(if more than one state all)

1
xxx-xx-8426
[Street Address of Debtor (No & Street, City, State & Zip Code)
I 241 East Angel Street
Sandy, UT 84070
•County of Residence or of the
[Principal Place of Business

S a '* Lake

iMailmg Address of Debtor (if different from street address)

[

[Street Address of Joint Debtor (No & Street, City, State & Zip Code)

1

County of Residence or of the
Principal Place of Busmess

1
1

Mailing Address of Jomt Debtor (if different from street address)

1

•Location of Principal Assets of Business Debtor
|(if different from street address above)
1

1
1

Information Regarding the Debtor (Check the Applicable Boxes)

1

[Venue (Check any applicable box)
1 1 Debtor has been domiciled or has had a residence, principal place of business, or principal assets in this Distnct for 180 days immediately
I
preceding the date of this petition or for a longer part of such 180 days than in any other District
1 D There is a bankruptcy case concerning debtor's affiliate, general partner, or partnership pending m this District

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
I
1

Chapter or Section of Bankruptcy Code Under Which
the Petition is Filed (Check one box)
Chapter 7
• Chapter 11
• Chapter 13
Chapter 9
• Chapter 12
Sec 304 - Case ancillary to foreign proceeding

1
1
1
1
1

Filing Fee (Check one box)
I Full Filing Fee attached
• Filing Fee to be paid in installments (Applicable to individuals only )
1
Must attach signed application for the court's consideration
certifying that the debtor is unable to pay fee except in installments
Rule 1006(b) See Official Form No 3

1
1
1
1
1
1

•
•
•
•

Type of Debtor (Check all boxes that apply)
Individual(s)
• Railroad
Corporation
Q Stockbroker
Partnership
• Commodity Broker
Other
• Clearing Bank

•
•
•

1
Nature of Debts (Check one box)
I U Consumer/Non-Business
D Business
1
Chapter 11 Small Business (Check all boxes that apply)
1 Q Debtor is a small business as defined in 11 U S C § 101
1 • Debtor is and elects to be considered a small business under
11 USC § 1121(e) (Optional)

[Statistical/Administrative Information (Estimates only)
1 1 Debtor estimates that funds will be available for distribution to unsecured creditors
• Debtor estimates that, after any exempt property is excluded and administrative expenses paid, there
will be no funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors
[Estimated Number of Creditors

1 15

I

•

16-49

50 99

•

•

100199

•

200999

THIS SPACE IS FOR COURT USE ONLY

1000-over

•

I

•

I

Estimated Assets
1

$0to
$50 000

$50 001 to
$100 000

D

$100 001 to
$500 000

•

•

$50 001 to
$100 000

$100 001 to
$500 000

•

D

$500 001 to
$1 million

$1 000 001 to
$10 million

D

$10 000 001 to
$50 million

•

•

$1 000 001 to
$10 rn liion

$10 000 001 to
$50 m llion

$50 000 001 to
$100 million

•

More than
$100 million

I

D

Estimated Debts
1

|

$0to
$50 000

D

Filed 07/29/04

$500 001 to
$1mlhon

D

P

D

$50 000 001 to
$100mllion

D

More than
$100 million

D

1
I

I

1

(Official Form 1) (12/03)
Name of Debtor(s):
Migliore, Amy

Voluntary Petition
(This page must be completed and filed in every case)

Location
Where Filed: ~ None •

FORM Bl, Page 2

Prior Bankruptcy Case Filed Within Last 6 Years (If more than one, attach additional sheet)
I Case Number:
I Date Filed:

Pending Bankruptcy Case Filed by any Spouse, Partner, or Affiliate of this Debtor (If more than one, attach additional sheet)
Case Number:
Name of Debtor:
Date Filed:
None Relationship:

District:

Judge:

Signatures
Signature(s) of Debtor(s) (Individual/Joint)
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this
petition is true and correct.
[If petitioner is an individual whose debts are primarily consumer debts
and has chosen to file under chapter 7] I am aware that I may proceed
under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of title 11, United States Code, understand
the relief available under each such chapter, and choose to proceed under
chapter 7.
I request relief in accordance with the chapter of title 11, United States
Code, specified in this petition.

Signature of Debtor Aniy Migliore

X.
Signature of Joint Debtor
Telephone Number (If not represented by attorney)

7-2^-oH
Date
SignaJnrecttAitflJCttey
Signature of Attorney for Debtor©
Michael F. Thomson 9707
Printed Name of Attorney for Debtor(s)
McDowell & Gillman, P.C.
Firm Name
50 West Broadway, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Exhibit A
(To be completed if debtor is required to file periodic reports (e.g., forms
10K and 10Q) with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and is
requesting relief under chapter 11)
• Exhibit A is attached and made a part of this petition.
Exhibit B
(To be completed if debtor is an individual
whose debts are primarily consumer debts)
I, the attorney for the petitioner named in the foregoing petition, declare
that I have informed the petitioner that [he or she] may proceed under
chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of title 11, United States Code, and have
explained the relief availableunjlfiiLe^ch such chapter.
£
Date
Signature of Attorney for Debtor(s)
Michael F. Thomson 9707
Exhibit C
Does the debtor own or have possession of any property that poses
a threat of imminent and identifiable harm to public health or
safety?
D Yes, and Exhibit C is attached and made a part of this petition.
• No

Signature of Non-Attorney Petition Preparer
I certify that I am a bankruptcy petition preparer as defined in 11 U.S.C.
§ 110, that I prepared this document for compensation, and that I have
provided the debtor with a copy of this document.
Printed Name of Bankruptcy Petition Preparer
Social Security Number (Required by 11 U.S.C.§ 110(c).)

Address
(801)359-3500
Telephone Number
Date
Signature of Debtor (Corporation/Partnership)
I declare under penalty of perjury that the information provided in this
petition is true and correct, and that I have been authorized to file this
petition on behalf of the debtor.
The debtor requests relief in accordance with the chapter of title 11,
United States Code, specified in this petition.

x
Signature of Authorized Individual

Address
Names and Social Security numbers of all other individuals who
prepared or assisted in preparing this document:

If more than one person prepared this document, attach additional
sheets conforming to the appropriate official form for each person.

x.Signature of Bankruptcy Petition Preparer

Printed Name of Authorized Individual

Date

Title of Authorized Individual

A bankruptcy petition preparer's failure to comply with the
provisions of title 11 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure may result in fines or imprisonment or both. 11
U.S.C. § 110; 18 U.S.C. § 156.

Date

!*sB?.!'*'i

The below described is SIGNED.

Dated: June 17, 2005
JUDITH A. BOULDEN
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

"V,„V

Order prepared by •
Kevin R. Anderson
Office Chapter 13 Trustee
405 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)596-2884
Facsimile: (801)596-2898
kratrusteemail(Sch 13kra.com
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

In re:

Case No. 04B-32149

AMY MIGLIORE,
Debtor.

Chapter 13 FILED ELECTRONICALLY
Judge Judith A. Boulden
(Confn motion Healing Date April 26, 2005)

ORDER CONFIRMING DEBTORS CHAPTER 13 PLAN
FOLLOWING CONTESTED CONFIRMATION HEARING
The Court originally set the confirmation hearing in this case for March 1, 2005.
Pursuant to court order, the confirmation hearing was continued to April 26, 2005 at 9:00 AM.
At such hearing, Kevin R. Anderson, Chapter 13 Trustee, appeared personally or by counsel, and
the Debtor and/or the Debtor's attorney appeared on the record.
At the hearing, the Trustee either recommended confirmation of the Debtor's plan, or the
Court confirmed the plan over the Trustee's objection, because the Court ruled that the plan
complied with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322 and 1325. Based on the Court's review of
the case, the representations of the Trustee and Debtor's counsel, and the evidence presented at
the hearing, the Court finds that notice was proper, that the Debtor proposed the plan in good

faith, and that the plan satisfies the requirements for confirmation. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
CONFIRMATION OF THE PLAN
1. The Debtor's Chapter 13 plan filed on February 28, 2005, as modified by this Order,
is confirmed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (hereinafter the "Plan"). Upon entry of this Order, the
effective date of confirmation shall relate back to the date of the confirmation hearing.
2. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), after the Debtor completes all payments under the
Plan, unless the Court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the Debtor, the Court
shall grant the Debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the Plan except any debt that is not
discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1), (2) or (3). Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Plan or this Order, a claim of any party in interest who did not receive adequate notice of this
bankruptcy case, as required by applicable law, may not be discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
PLAN PAYMENTS
3. The Debtor shall make Plan payments to the Trustee pursuant to the following terms
and conditions:
a. Debtor shall make Plan payments to the Trustee of $50.00 per month on or
before the 25th day of each month. The Debtor shall continue to make such payments to
the Trustee for a period of not more than 60 months from the date the first payment came
due under the Plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a), or until such time as non-priority,
unsecured claimholders receive no less than a 100% return plus simple interest of 1.17%
per annum on their allowed claims.
b. The debtor shall immediately pay to the Trustee all funds collected under
judgment(s) against Scott Migliore, and such judgment proceeds shall be over and above
the regular plan payments of $50 per month. The collection of such judgment proceeds
shall be in a sufficient amount to fully complete the plan by July 29, 2009, or the debtor
shall be in default.
c. The property shall not revest in the Debtor, but shall remain property of the
estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364, until discharge is granted.
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ATTORNEY'S FEES
4. Counsel for the Debtor is hereby awarded fees and costs in the total amount of
$4,906.06 as an administrative claim under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Rule
2016 Statement filed in this case, counsel received a prepetition retainer of $785.00; therefore,
the balance of $4,121.06 will be paid through the Plan in the following manner:

Debtor's

counsel will receive up to $3,971.06 from the first disbursement made in the case, contingent on
the Trustee having such funds available, with the balance, if any, to be paid in the amount of no
more than $25.00 per subsequent disbursement until paid in full.
RULINGS ON CLAIMS
5. All claims of creditors who did not file a proof of claim with the Bankruptcy Court or
claims of creditors who filed a proof of claim after the deadline set in the Notice of Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Case, Meeting of Creditors, & Deadlines shall not receive a distribution under the
Plan.
6. Claim No. 2 filed by Jordan Credit Union is allowed as a secured claim in the amount
of $8,300.22 together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, to accrue from the date
of petition. No unsecured portion shall be paid on this claim under the plan.
7. Countrywide Home Loans shall be paid direct by the Debtor, outside the Plan. The
Trustee shall make no distribution on this claim under the Plan.
8. All allowed unsecured priority claims under 11 U.S.C. § 507 will be paid in full
through deferred cash payments pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) plus simple interest of 1.17%
per annum on their allowed claims.
9.

If any additional tax liability is determined to be due after confirmation of the Plan,

the Debtor may elect to modify the Plan under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1329 to include payment of such
liability. If the Plan is not modified, such tax liability will not be discharged under 11 U.S.C. §
1328.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
10. The Trustee is granted authority to set procedures for making disbursements under the
Plan. Such disbursements shall be made in a manner consistent with the Bankruptcy Code, the
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Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Schedule of Disbursements attached hereto as
Exhibit A and incorporated herein by this reference.
11. Any modifications to the Plan must be made pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
12. The Trustee is allowed the commission provided by 28 U.S.C. § 586. Any reference
in the Plan to the percentage of such commission is an estimate only and is subject to increase or
decrease by the United States Attorney General.
13. If this case is dismissed or converted to another Chapter under the Bankruptcy Code,
any Plan payments received by the Trustee prior to the entry of an order of conversion or
dismissal shall be paid to creditors pursuant to the Plan, while payments received after the entry
of such order shall be refunded to the Debtor. In making any final disbursement under this
paragraph, the Trustee is hereby authorized to decline to disburse funds on any unsettled,
contingent, disputed, duplicate, unliquidated, late-filed or otherwise legally insufficient claim,
including where a disbursement check on a claim has been returned to the Trustee by the United
States Mail as undeliverable.
14. In the event an error is made in disbursements to creditors, the Trustee may, without
prior notice to parties in interest, rectify such errors by any legal means including off-sets and
surcharges against future disbursements in this case owing to the creditor who received the
erroneous disbursement.
15. During the term of the Plan, the Debtor shall not sell or transfer property of the estate
or collateral provided for in the Plan without a Court order under 11 U.S.C. § 363 and prior
written notice to the Trustee. A creditor shall not accept any insurance or sale proceeds from
collateral provided for in the Plan unless an amended proof of claim is filed with the Court and
prior written notice thereof is provided to the Trustee. If the Plan provides that the Trustee will
make disbursements on a specific claim, and that claim is paid from another source, the Trustee
shall nonetheless be entitled to his statutory commission on such amount as would have been
disbursed by the Trustee under the Plan. Except as specifically provided for in the Plan, property
of the estate remains in the Debtor's possession and control and does not vest in the Trustee.
16. During the term of the Plan, the Debtor shall not incur any new material debt without
a Court order under 11 U.S.C. § 364 and prior written notice to the Trustee.
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17. In the event the Debtor does not perform any provision of the Plan or this Order, the
Trustee may file with the Court a Declaration of Non-Compliance. The Trustee shall serve a
copy of such declaration on the Debtor and Debtor's counsel.
18. If after confirmation of the Plan, a creditor amends its timely, allowed proof of claim,
the Trustee shall give notice to the Debtor and Debtor's counsel whether such amended proof of
claim, if allowed, causes the Plan to be unfeasible. If the amended claim does not render the
plan unfeasible, and if the Trustee does not receive a response to the contrary from the Debtor's
counsel within ten (10) days after service of such notice, the Trustee shall pay such claim in the
amended amount. If the amended claim renders the plan unfeasible, the Trustee may move to
dismiss the case or to modify the Plan.
19. The Trustee is hereby authorized to exercise discretion in administering this case
including, but not limited to, out-of-court resolutions of postconfirmation defaults arising from
the Debtor's failure to make timely Plan payments.
DATED:

, 2005.
BY THE COURT.

THE HONORABLE JUDITH A. BOULDEN
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Approved As To Form And Content:

R. MONT MCDOWELL
Attorney for the Debtor
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Older was
served by ECF (as indicated below) or addressed to the following persons and deposited in the
U.S. Mail, first-class postage prepaid, on the 7th day of June 2005. Pursuant to Rule 9021-(c),
Local Rules of Practice of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, persons
who appeared at the hearing, and who have not otherwise approved the Order, shall have eight
(8) days from the date of service to file an objection to the form of the Order. If an objection is
not timely filed, the Order shall be deemed approved, and the Court may enter the Order.
R. MONT MCDOWELL
MCDOWELL & GILLMAN P.C.
50 W. BROADWAY, 12TH FLR.
SLC,UT 84101
/s/
Office Chapter 13 Trustee

COURT SERVICE LIST
KEVIN R. ANDERSON
STANDING CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE
ECF NOTIFICATION
AMY MIGLIORE
241 EAST ANGEL STREET
SANDY UT 84070
R. MONT MCDOWELL
MCDOWELL & GILLMAN P.C.
50 W. BROADWAY, 12TH FLR.
SLC,UT 84101
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Kevin R Anderson, Bar #4786
STANDING CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE
405 South Mam Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801)596-2884
Facsimile (801)596-2898
Email kiatrusteemail(Schl3kra com
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
IN RE

Case No 04B-32149

AMY MIGLIORE

Chapter 13
Debtor(s)

FILED ELECTRONICALLY

JUDGE JUDITH A BOULDEN
CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S
FINAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTING
OF COMPLETED CHAPTER 13 PLAN

Kevin R Anderson, Standing Chaptei 13 Trustee, hereby lespectfiilly submits this Final Report and
Accounting The Trustee declaies under penalty of peijury as follows
The above entitled case was filed on July 29, 2004
The Fust Meeting of Creditois was held on Septembei 3, 2004
The Plan was confiimed on Apnl 26, 2005
The Plan was consummated on (the date of the final payment) Apnl 3, 2006
The Plan teims weie met accoidmg to the Confiimation Oidei and any subsequent oideis
The duiation of the Plan was 11 months
The dividend paid to the imseciued class was 100 00 % puisuant to Couit Oidei
The Tiustee disbuised funds to cieditois as listed in the confiimed Plan
The following is the Tiustee's summaiy of leceipts and disbuisements made in this case

Total Receipts

15,053.71

Disbursements:
Total Trustee Commission

1,216.84

Total Attorney Fees

4,471.06

Adequate Protection
Secured Claims
Total Secured Claims

.00
8,064.53
8,064.53

Total Priority Claims

.00

Total Unsecured Claims

.00

Dividend paid to unsecured class 100.00 %
Debtor Refund
Court Fees and Expenses
Total Refund/Court Fees
Total Disbursements

1,301.28
.00
1,301.28
15,053.71

A detailed report of disbursements and claims paid is annexed hereto as Exhibit "AM and made a part
part hereof by this reference.
The Tmstee certifies that the foregoing summary and report annexed as Exhibit "A" are true and
complete, that the debtor(s) has(have) fully completed all payments pursuant to the confirmed Plan, and that
all administrative matters for which the Tmstee is responsible and all matters over which the Court retained
jurisdiction have been completed.

DATED: 05/19/2006

KRA /S/
KEVIN R. ANDERSON,
Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
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TRUSTEE'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I the undersigned, do hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing Final Report and
Accounting of Completed Chapter 13 Plan was properly addressed, posted in the U.S. Mail, first class, postage
prepaid on 05/19/2006 to the following parties at the addresses listed below:
AMY MIGLIORE
241 EAST ANGEL STREET
SANDY UT
84070
MICHAEL F. THOMSON
ECF Notification

/S/
Employee of Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
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